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ABSTRACT 
ANALYZING INFLATION TARGET MISSES 
  
Kırımhan, Destan  
 M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan 
September 2010 
 
This thesis identifies the roles of both domestic and global factors in missing 
the inflation targets with the help of Arellano-Bond fixed effects estimation. Central 
bank credibility has the largest absolute effect on target misses; exchange rate and 
fiscal surplus ratio to GDP have the medium absolute effect on target misses. Oil 
prices seem to have significant but limited effect. This thesis also examines whether 
there is any difference in the formation of inflation expectations when countries miss 
their inflation targets with the help of linear ordinary least squares estimation. The 
results may suggest that when CB does not achieve its target, the total weight put on 
the lagged inflation will be higher than that of the inflation target. Thus, in this 
analysis, inflation target misses are causing inflation inertia which leads to a more 
costly disinflationary monetary policy in the short run. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence of the asymmetry between inflation target misses in the sense that the 
weights put on overshooting and undershooting are not the same.  
 
Keywords: Inflation target misses, inflation expectations, emerging market 
economies. 
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ÖZET 
ENFLASYON HEDEFİNDEN SAPMALARIN ANALİZİ 
  
Kırımhan, Destan  
 Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan 
Eylül 2010 
 
Bu yüksek lisans tezi Arellano-Bond sabit etkiler tahmin yöntemi yardımıyla 
hem iç hem de küresel faktörlerin enflasyon hedefinden sapmalar üzerine etkilerini 
belirlemektedir. Hedeften sapmalar üzerinde Merkez Bankası kredibilitesi en fazla; 
döviz kuru ve mali fazlanın GSYİH’ya oranı orta derecede mutlak etkiye sahiptir. 
Petrol fiyatlarının önemli ama sınırlı etkisi vardır. Bu tez ayrıca, doğrusal sıradan en 
küçük kareler yöntemi yardımıyla ülkeler enflasyon hedeflerini kaçırdıklarında 
enflasyon beklentilerinin oluşturulmasında herhangi bir farklılık olup olmadığını 
incelemektedir. Sonuçlar, Merkez Bankası’nın hedefi tutturamadığı zaman gecikmeli 
enflasyona verilen toplam ağırlığın enflasyon hedefine verilenden daha fazla 
olabileceğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu analizde, enflasyon hedefinden 
sapmalar kısa vadede daha maliyetli dezenflasyonist bir para politikasına yol açan 
enflasyon ataletine neden olmaktadır. Bunun yanısıra, hedefin üstündeki sapmalar ile 
altındaki sapmalara verilen ağırlığın aynı olmaması bakımından enflasyon 
hedefinden sapmalar arasında bir asimetri olduğuna yönelik kanıt bulunmaktadır.  
  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Enflasyon hedefinden sapmalar, enflasyon beklentileri, 
gelişmekte olan ekonomiler. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime that requires announcements of 
official inflation targets and acceptance that the primary long run objective of 
monetary authority to maintain price stability. New Zealand was the initiator of 
inflation targeting regime in 1990 and then several industrialized countries put this 
regime into practice. Emerging market economies began to adopt inflation targeting 
regime in 1991 with the initiation of Chile. 
The performance of inflation targeting countries on lowering inflation is 
positive. Average inflation for inflation targeters has declined from 38.8% to 4.9% 
from pre-targeting period to post-targeting period.1 Average inflation for non-
targeters has declined from 14% to 7.3% from pre-targeting period to post-targeting 
period when the average date of targeters is taken as the date of targeting for non-
targeters. Therefore, average inflation has decreased by 87% for targeters whereas 
47.4% for non-targeters. (Figure 1.1) 
However, the average inflation in emerging market economies (EMEs) is not as 
low as that of industrialized economies (INDs). Before inflation targeting, the 
                                                 
1 These calculations are done with the data taken from the IMF database.  
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average inflation in INDs was 8.8%, whereas after the adoption of inflation targeting, 
it declined to 2.7%. Before inflation targeting, the average inflation in EMEs was 
57.3%, whereas after the adoption of inflation targeting, it declined to 6.2%.  (Figure 
1.2) Thus, the substantial decrease in inflation for EMEs is not enough to match the 
low inflation numbers observed in INDs.  
In addition, the deviations of actual inflation from the target inflation are 
considerably higher in EMEs compared to those of INDs. Average inflation target 
misses in INDs for the period of 2002-2009 is -0,2 whereas it is 0,8 for EMEs 
(Figure 1.3). Thus, inflation target misses is an emerging market economy 
phenomenon. Moreover, absolute average inflation target misses in INDs for the 
period of 2002-2009 is 0,8 whereas it is 1,8 for EMEs. (Figure 1.4) 
The factors that cause inflation target misses for EMEs are the main focus of 
this chapter. This study investigates the roles of country-specific and global factors 
on causation of inflation target misses in EMEs with the help of a fixed effects 
estimation procedure. The motivation behind this idea is that by knowing the 
underlying factors that cause inflation target misses, Central Banks can intervene to 
reduce or eliminate the effect of that specific factor and by this way, inflation target 
can be achieved and the credibility of the inflation targeting regime can be increased. 
The results suggest that central bank credibility has the largest absolute effect 
on target misses with the coefficient of 0,34. Then, exchange rate and fiscal surplus 
ratio to GDP have the medium absolute effect on target misses with a total coefficient 
of 0,043. The smallest effect belongs to the global factor which is the world fuel oil 
prices with 0,02. 
The next chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents the 
aforementioned country-specific and global factors that can cause inflation target 
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misses by past papers. The second section presents the methodology and the model 
which is employed to capture the importance levels of country-specific and global 
factors for inflation target misses. The third section introduces the data used in the 
analysis. The fourth section discusses the estimation results and the last section 
concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
ROLES OF FACTORS IN MISSING INFLATION TARGETS 
 
 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
The country-specific and global factors that cause inflation target misses are 
mentioned separately in this paper. First, the country-specific factors are taken into 
consideration. 
The most common factor signalized in the past papers as causing inflation 
target misses is exchange rate movements. Roger and Stone (2005) and Gosselin 
(2007) have indicated that large misses are often caused by exchange rate shocks in 
both the EMEs and INDs. 
 Furthermore, Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2003) have stated that EMEs are 
more prone to sudden stops in capital inflows that affect the exchange rate and in 
turn the inflation rate. 
 Another common factor aforementioned in the past papers is the fiscal 
dominance. Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2003) 
have stated that the attempts to impose discipline on fiscal policy are important for 
the performance of the Central Bank. Gosselin (2007) have mentioned that the 
inflation deviations are positively correlated with fiscal deficits. Moreover, Mishkin 
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(2000) have indicated that absence of fiscal dominance is a key prerequisite for 
inflation targeting since large fiscal deficits will gradually eroded by a large 
depreciation which is followed by a high inflation. Kumhof (2001) have indicated 
that countries that are planning to adopt inflation targeting regime should realize the 
need of achieving and sustaining fiscal discipline and prevent large exchange rate 
fluctuations.  
 Another common factor is the credibility of the monetary authority. Fraga, 
Goldfajn and Minella (2003) have indicated that the expected and in turn the actual 
inflation are prone to be larger with the imperfect credibility than that of with the 
perfect credibility. Also, the inflation volatility is more likely to be higher compared 
to that of with the perfect credibility. Nahon and Meurer (2009) have stated that in 
inflation targeting regimes, to decrease the inflation to the target level, agents must 
believe that the central bank commits to the target. Thus, the credibility of the central 
bank is important for recording low inflation.  
 The last common factor is the independence of the monetary authority. 
Gosselin (2007) have stated that the inflation deviations are negatively correlated 
with central bank independence. 
 Second, the global factors are taken into consideration. 
The most common factor signalized in the past papers as causing inflation 
target misses is the world oil prices. Roger and Stone (2005) have indicated that all 
of the countries are vulnerable to changes in world fuel prices and added that 
overshooting the inflation targets are caused by higher fuel prices brought by higher 
world import prices in Poland in 2000. Furthermore, Batini and Tereanu (2009) have 
stated that the supply shock generating high oil prices disseminate to headline CPI in 
most countries, however net importers of oil were affected most. Neumann and 
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Hagen (2002) have done a study that compares inflation rates after the 1978 and 
1998 oil price shocks and concluded that inflation targeting central banks gained 
more credibility than those of the non-inflation targeting countries.  
Another common factor is the food prices. Roger and Stone (2005) have 
indicated that an increase in food prices caused an overshooting in South Africa in 
2003.  
Mishkin and Savastano (2000) have indicated that inflation targeting ensures 
monetary policy to put weight on domestic factors and to react to both the domestic 
and the global shocks. Holub and Hurnik (2008) have estimated a set of VAR models 
for Czech Republic and found that the shock to food prices has the largest impact on 
financial markets’ inflation expectations and the reaction of inflation expectations to 
commodity price shocks is significant. Furthermore, exchange rate shocks have a 
greater impact than commodity price shocks. Roger (2009) has indicated that in the 
adoption period of inflation targeting regime by most of the countries, global 
macroeconomic conditions such as global commodity prices and financial shocks 
have been stable relative to past periods. Therefore, there is a little evidence that the 
inflation targeting regime is robust to global shocks. Roger has also stated that 
inflation targeting countries minimized the inflationary effects of increases in the 
commodity prices in 2007 better since central banks put a large weight on inflation 
and thus, inflation expectations were anchored well.  
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) have estimated a multivariate probit 
model for the probability of adopting inflation-targeting regime, based on the 
variables that are monetary growth, the fiscal surplus ratio to GDP, exchange rate 
band width, central bank independence. That paper examines the relationship 
between the likelihood of adopting inflation-targeting regime and the country-
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specific factors. However, in this analysis, the relationship between the inflation 
target misses and both the country-specific and global factors is examined.  
Gosselin (2007) have estimated a fixed effects model to investigate the effect 
of exchange rate movements, fiscal deficits and differences in financial sector 
development to the deviations from inflation targets. That paper lacked of the global 
factors and the past period’s inflation target misses as the proxy for the central bank 
credibility. However, in this analysis, the global factors are utilized and the 
importance levels of the country-specific, domestic and global factors that are central 
bank credibility, exchange rate and fiscal surplus ratio to GDP and oil prices, 
respectively are found. These findings may guide central banks in determining the 
weights put on different domestic and global factors and how to react to those 
factors.  
  
 
2.2 The Model and Methodology 
The estimation procedure used in this study to investigate the roles of country-
specific and global factors on inflation target misses in EMEs is fixed effects since in 
the data, there are some domestic factors that are subject to change in time, some 
country-specific factors that are constant in time which represents the unobserved 
heterogeneity among countries and some global factors that are subject to change in 
time but fixed among countries. Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation 
procedure under fixed effects is employed since lag of the dependent variable is used 
as an explanatory variable in the model. 
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2.2.1 The Model 
The general representation of the fixed effects model in this chapter is as follows: 
Yit = βXit + γt + uit 
where Xit’s includes both the country-specific and domestic factors that are central 
bank credibility, exchange rate and fiscal surplus ratio to GDP, respectively, γt’s are 
the global factors that are subject to change in time but fixed among countries that is 
world oil prices and uit’s are the idiosyncratic error terms. 
Therefore, the model in this chapter will be as follows: 
ITMit = β1 [EXit FISit] + β2 [OILt] + β3 [ITMit-1] + uit 
where i is the country indicator, t is the time indicator, ITM is inflation target miss, 
EX is exchange rates, FIS is fiscal surplus ratio to GDP, OIL is the world fuel oil 
prices, and ITMit-1 is the one period lagged inflation target miss that is used as a 
proxy for the central bank credibility.  
In this model specification, since the cross correlation between world food 
prices and world fuel oil prices is 0,96 which is high enough to cause a 
multicollinearity problem, only the world oil prices are employed.  
 
 
 2.3 Data 
Annual actual and target inflation, exchange rates, fiscal surplus and GDP for 12 
inflation targeter EMEs that are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, 
Peru, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey for the period of 
2003-2008 are utilized. Furthermore, annual world food and fuel oil prices are 
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employed for the period of 2003-2008.  
All data are available at IMF database and the central banks of each country. 
  
 
2.4 Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the model are presented in the Table 4.7 in the appendix. 
All of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% significance level and 
the signs are as expected. The coefficient of past period’s target miss indicates that 
1% increase in the past period’s target miss causes a 0,34% increase in the current 
period’s target miss. Thus, there seems to be inertia in inflation target misses. The 
effect of 1% increase in the exchange rate (i.e. the depreciation of domestic currency) 
on the current period’s target miss is 0,003% which is the exchange rate pass through 
coefficient. The effect of 1% increase in the fiscal surplus ratio to GDP on the current 
period’s target miss is -0,04% meaning that budget deficits can explain the inflation 
target misses.2 The coefficient of world fuel oil prices indicates that 1% increase in 
the world fuel oil prices causes a 0,02% increase in the current period’s target miss 
by increasing the cost of production. 
Country-specific factor which is the Central Bank credibility criterion in this 
model has the largest absolute effect on target misses with the coefficient of 0,34. 
Then, the domestic factors that are subject to change in time which are the exchange 
rates and fiscal surplus ratio to GDP in this model have the medium absolute effect 
on target misses with a total coefficient of 0,043. The smallest effect belongs to the 
global factor which is the world fuel oil prices with 0,02. 
Note that R2 and the adjusted R2 are negative. However, negative R2 can be 
                                                 
2 It may well be the case that a supply shock can affect the two variables and cause a spurious relation.  
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observed when the instrumental variable approach is used because the aim of this 
method is to get accurate estimates of the coefficients but R2 indicates only how well 
the data is fit. 
Note also that there are J-statistic and instrument rank. The J statistic is simply 
the Sargan test statistic that is the value of the GMM objective function at estimated 
parameters. Here, since the instrument rank of 18 is greater than the number of 
estimated coefficients (4), the J statistic of 27,33487 can be used to construct the 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. 
Under the null hypothesis that all of the instruments are strong, the Sargan 
statistic is distributed as a chisquare where the degrees of freedom is the difference 
between the number of estimated coefficients and the instrument rank. The p-value 
of this model is found as 0,0173 which indicates a very small probability to reject the 
null hypothesis. Thus, the results may suggest that the model is statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level and all of the instruments are strong. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The performance of inflation targeting countries on lowering inflation is positive. 
However, the average inflation in emerging market economies (EMEs) is not as low 
as that of industrialized economies (INDs). In addition, the deviations of actual 
inflation from the target inflation are considerably higher in EMEs compared to those 
of INDs. The differences between the performances of inflation target regime of 
EMEs and INDs are the main focus of this paper. Thus, in this chapter of the paper, 
the roles of both country-specific and global factors in missing the inflation targets 
                                                 
3 The p-value can be found as p-value=chisquare |number of estimated coefficients – instrument rank| (J statistic)  =  χ2 
27,33487 (14) = 0.017 
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with the help of Arellano-Bond fixed effects estimation are identified for EMEs in 
the period of 2003-2008. 
Country-specific factor in the model is the last period’s target miss which is 
used as a proxy variable for Central Bank credibility criterion and the global factor is 
the world fuel oil prices. There are also domestic factors that are subject to change 
over time which are exchange rates and fiscal surplus ratio to GDP. 
Central bank credibility has the largest absolute effect on target misses with the 
coefficient of 0,34. Then, exchange rate movements and fiscal surplus ratio to GDP 
have the medium absolute effect on target misses with a total coefficient of 0,043. 
The smallest effect belongs to the global factor which is the world oil prices with 
0,02. 
Monetary authority is not expected to respond to global factors such as oil 
prices, which are exogenous. However, central banks can affect exchange rates of 
their currencies and their credibility by achieving inflation targets. Besides, the 
coordination between the fiscal and monetary policy is important since if government 
produces fiscal deficits for a long time, there will be most probably inflation target 
misses and the influential level of monetary policy will be limited with the level of 
fiscal tightness. From the Box 1 titled as “Analyzing the Dynamics of Two 
Successful Inflation Targeters”, it cannot be suggested that there is a general 
statement that the successful inflation targeters have budget deficits or surpluses. Yet, 
the Brazilian experience shows that successful inflation targeters may give budget 
surpluses and  Switzerland experience displays that if inflation targeters give budget 
deficits, they set some constitutional mechanisms aiming to eliminate structural 
deficits to be successful.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
EFFECTS OF TARGET MISSES ON INFLATION 
EXPECTATIONS 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2, the roles of both the global and the country-specific factors in missing 
inflation targets were specified. These factors cause deviations of actual inflation 
from the target inflation and thus create a credibility loss. It is may well be the case 
that in a country where its central bank is not credible, people will gradually form 
their inflation expectations by attaining more importance to past inflations and less to 
official inflation targets. Thus, this will lead to inflation persistence. By this way, the 
link between the inflation target misses and loss of credibility will be strengthened. 
This chapter examines whether there is any difference in the forming of 
inflation expectations when countries miss their inflation targets. The motivation 
behind this idea is that after inflation target misses if people give more weight to past 
inflations when forming their inflation expectations, there will be inflation inertia 
which will lead to a more costly disinflationary monetary policy. 
To examine whether there is any difference in the formation of inflation 
expectations when countries miss their inflation targets, both the linear OLS and the 
panel generalized method of moments for the same model specification is employed. 
13 
 
Besides this main model specification, another model specification that uses the 
absolute value of inflation target misses is employed to check whether there is any 
evidence of the asymmetry between inflation target misses. 
The results may suggest that when CB does not achieve its target, the total 
weight put on the lagged inflation will be higher than that of the inflation target. 
Thus, for the seven years period of 2003-2009 and for the countries in this analysis, 
inflation target misses are causing inflation inertia which leads to a more costly 
disinflationary monetary policy in the short run. 
Furthermore, there is an important point to mention that when CB does not 
achieve its target, the amount of decrease in the weight put on inflation target (0,03) 
is higher than the amount of increase in the weight put on lagged inflation (0,02). 
Therefore, the total weight that can cause inflation inertia year by year is 0,05 on the 
assumption that parameters are statistically significant.  
When the results of the absolute value model is compared with those of the 
level model, there is some evidence of the asymmetry between inflation target misses 
in the sense that the weights put on overshooting and undershooting are not the same.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents the past 
literature about the effects of inflation target misses on expectation formations. The 
second section presents the methodology and the model which is employed. The 
third section introduces the data used in the analysis. The fourth section discusses the 
estimation results and the last section concludes. 
 
 
3.1 Literature Review 
Little and Romano (2009) have stated that for inflation targeting countries, the 
14 
 
inflation target may serve to anchor expectations whereas in non-inflation targeting 
countries lagged inflation may serve that role and the ability of inflation targeting to 
help control inflation expectations stems from the premium it places on improving 
transparency standards. However, Laubach and Posen (1997) have indicated that 
both in Canada and New Zealand, it seems plausible to model lagged inflation as a 
determinant of private sector inflation expectations. Thus, inflation targeting regime 
does not seem to cause a revolution in expectation formation in Canada and New 
Zealand whereas in Germany and Switzerland, due to the confidentially proven 
inflation targeting regime, inflation expectations display a high degree of inertia 
caused by the limited upswing moves of inflation after shocks and the pace of 
response to disinflation.  
Pétursson (2004) has marked that inflation targeting has reduced inflation 
persistence and thus inflation expectations are more forward looking after the 
introduction of inflation targeting. Moreover, according to Pétursson, it has also 
increased the credibility of monetary policy. Furthermore, Corbo, Landerretche and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) have indicated that inflation targeting strengthen the impact 
of forward-looking expectations on inflation, thus weakened the weight put on the 
past inflation inertia. Moreover, Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) have stated that 
inflation targeting displayed a role in keeping long run inflation expectations in 
control and in decreasing the persistence of inflation showing that five inflation 
targeters that are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and United Kingdom 
have delinked inflation expectations from the actual inflation.  
Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2003) have stated that there are two main 
obstacles for reducing inflation. One of them is the imperfect credibility of central 
bank and the other is the presence of some degree of inflation persistence that is 
15 
 
caused by some backward-looking behavior in price setting. They also marked that in 
the case where aggregate supply is more forward-looking, if there is a reduction in 
the inflation target, inflation converges to new target automatically. 
Nahon and Meurer (2009) have stated that in inflation targeting regimes, to 
decrease inflation to the target level, agents must believe that the central bank 
commits to the target. Thus, the credibility of the central bank is important for 
recording low inflation. Furthermore, King (1996) has stated that monetary policy 
that aims at ensuring price stability must take learning about the implicit inflation 
target by agents into account and expedite the learning process by making their own 
preferences explicit.  
However, Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn and Muinhos (2003) have indicated that 
central banks are conducting monetary policy in a forward-looking manner and 
responds to shocks that cause inflation target misses. They also find that in the low 
inflation periods, the backward-looking term in the aggregate supply for inflation 
targeting countries has declined. 
The argument of Akerlof (2002) that the degree of attention to a particular 
variable in expectation formations may depend on the level of the variable is related 
to the findings of Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn and Muinhos (2003). For example, the 
effect of realized inflation on the inflation expectations may be high during 
inflationary episodes. Mishkin (2001) have stated that when inflation is reduced to 
low levels, inflation has not increased due to the cyclical expansions in the inflation 
targeting countries.  
Holub and Hurnik (2008) have estimated a set of VAR models for Czech 
Republic to analyze the formation of inflation expectations in the presence of some 
shocks. They have found that the reaction of inflation expectations is lower relative 
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to the inflationary effects of shocks.  
Başkaya, Kara and Mutluer (2008) have indicated that there is a significant 
heterogeneity in the process of forming inflation expectations in Turkey. Agents pay 
attention to both the inflation target and the realization of inflation. However, real 
sector puts a higher weight to past inflation than the financial sector and an increase 
in the depreciation of TL leads to higher inflation expectations especially for the 
financial sector. 
Most of the papers have pointed to the importance of credibility of the central 
bank and introduction of inflation targeting regime on anchoring inflation 
expectations and thus reducing inflation. They have also marked that some degree of 
inflation persistence, in other words backward looking behavior in price setting, is an 
obstacle in front of the central bank to anchor inflation expectations. The paper that 
is mentioned lastly has stated that agents put some weight to both the actual inflation 
and the inflation target. Yet, it has highlighted the differences between the real and 
the financial sector in forming their inflation expectations. However, in this study, 
after the introduction of inflation targeting regime, the importance of achieving the 
inflation target for the central banks on controlling inflation expectations will be 
examined. 
  
 
3.2 The Model and Methodology 
To examine whether there is any difference in the formation of inflation expectations 
when countries miss their inflation targets, both the linear OLS and the panel 
generalized method of moments for the same model specification will be employed. 
The main model specification in this chapter will be as follows: 
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EXPit = β[TARit ACTit-1 TARit* ITMit-1 ACTit-1* ITMit-1] + εit 
where i is the country indicator, t is the time indicator, EXP is expected inflation, 
TAR is inflation target, ACT is actual inflation and ITM is the value of the inflation 
target miss. Here, TAR*ITM is an interaction term that accounts for the effect of 
inflation target on expected inflation controlling for the level of past period’s 
inflation target miss and ACT*ITM is an interaction term that accounts for the effect 
of lagged inflation on expected inflation controlling for the level of past period’s 
inflation target miss. 
In addition to this main model specification, another model specification will 
be employed to check whether putting not the level but the absolute value of inflation 
target misses will make any difference. In other words, in the absolute value 
specification, it is assumed that the same weight is given to the undershooting and 
the overshooting whereas in the level value specification, there is no such 
assumption. Therefore, the differences between the results of these model 
specifications will exhibit whether people give the same or different weights to 
undershooting and overshooting.  
The absolute value model specification in this chapter will be as follows: 
EXPit = β[TARit ACTit-1 TARit* |ITMit-1| ACTit-1* |ITMit-1|] + εit 
The only difference in this specification is that |ITM| is the absolute value of the 
inflation target miss.  
 
 
3.3 Data 
In this study, inflation targets, actual inflations and inflation expectation survey data 
18 
 
of the 21 inflation targeting countries where 14 of them are emerging market 
economies that are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, 
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey 
and 7 of them are industrialized countries that are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom for the period of 2003-2009 will 
be used. 
All of the data are available at IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, 
datastream and the central banks of each country. 
  
 
3.4 Estimation Results 
Estimation results of the main model with linear OLS are presented in the Table 4.8 
in the appendix. Note that both the R2 and the adjusted R2 are 0,88 and 0,87, 
respectively which are high enough to conclude that the model fits the data well. All 
of the coefficients are significant at the 10% significance level and the signs of the 
coefficients are as expected. The coefficient of lagged inflation indicates that 1% 
increase in the actual inflation causes a 0,47% increase in the next period’s expected 
inflation. The coefficient of inflation target indicates that 1% increase in the inflation 
target causes a 0,48% increase in that period’s expected inflation. 
If central bank (CB) achieves its target, then the value of ITM will be zero. 
Thus, both of the interaction terms will become zero and only inflation target and 
lagged inflation variables will exist in the regression. From the table of the regression 
results, it can be seen that the coefficient of inflation target (0,48) is higher than that 
of the lagged inflation (0,47), meaning that if CB achieves its target, people will put 
more weight to the inflation target than the lagged inflation. 
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If CB does not achieve its target, then the value of ITM will be different than 
zero. Thus, both of the interaction terms will remain in the regression. From the table 
of the regression results, it can be seen that the coefficient of the interaction term that 
accounts for the effect of inflation target on expected inflation controlling for the 
level of inflation target miss is negative, meaning that the total weight put on the 
inflation target will decrease by 0,03 if CB does not achieve its target. Furthermore, 
it can also be seen that the coefficient of the interaction term that accounts for the 
effect of lagged inflation on expected inflation controlling for the level of inflation 
target miss is positive, meaning that the total weight put on the lagged inflation will 
increase by 0,02 if CB does not achieve its target. 
However, it can also be stated that if CB does not achieve its target, the total 
weight put on the lagged inflation (sum of the coefficients of lagged inflation and the 
interaction term for the lagged inflation which is 0,49) will be higher than that of the 
inflation target (sum of the coefficients of inflation target and the interaction term for 
the inflation target which is 0,45). This can be interpreted as for the seven years 
period of 2003-2009 and for these countries, inflation target misses are causing 
inflation inertia in the short run which leads to a more costly disinflationary 
monetary policy.  
There is an important point to mention that when CB does not achieve its 
target, the amount of decrease in the weight put on inflation target (0,03) is higher 
than the amount of increase in the weight put on lagged inflation (0,02). Therefore, 
the total amount of weight that can cause inflation inertia year by year is 0,05. 
Estimation results of the main model with panel GMM are presented in the 
Table 4.9 in the appendix. 
Note that all of the results are same with the estimated model by linear OLS.  
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Different from the linear OLS model, there are J-statistic and instrument rank. 
The J statistic is simply the Sargan test statistic that is the value of the GMM 
objective function at estimated parameters. Here, since the instrument rank of 5 is not 
greater than the number of estimated coefficients (5), the J statistic of -13,4527 
cannot be used to construct the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. 
Estimation results of the absolute value specification model with OLS are 
presented in the Table 4.10 in the appendix. 
Note that both the R2 and the adjusted R2 are 0,875 and 0,872, respectively 
which are high enough to conclude that the model fits the data well. The coefficients 
of both the target and the lagged inflation are significant at the 1% significance level. 
However, the coefficients of the interaction terms are not significant even at the 10% 
significance level. Therefore, the results may suggest that in the formation of 
inflation expectations, the weight put on the undershooting is not the same with that 
of the overshooting. Furthermore, there is some evidence of the asymmetry between 
inflation target misses in the sense that the weights put on overshooting and 
undershooting are not the same.  
 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter of the thesis, whether there is any difference in the formation of 
inflation expectations when countries miss their inflation targets is examined with the 
help of linear ordinary least square estimation for 21 countries for the period of 
2003-2009. 
The results may suggest that when CB achieves its target, people will put more 
weight to the inflation target than the lagged inflation. If CB does not achieve its 
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target, the total weight put on the inflation target will decrease by 0,03 and the total 
weight put on the lagged inflation will increase by 0,02. 
The results may allege that if CB does not achieve its target, the total weight 
put on the lagged inflation (0,49) will be higher than that of the inflation target 
(0,45). This can be interpreted as for the seven years period of 2003-2009 and for 
these countries, inflation target misses are causing inflation inertia which leads to a 
more costly disinflationary monetary policy.  
Furthermore, there is an important point to mention that when CB does not 
achieve its target, the amount of decrease in the weight put on inflation target (0,03) 
is higher than the amount of increase in the weight put on lagged inflation (0,02). 
Therefore, the total weight that can cause inflation inertia year by year is 0,05. 
Since the coefficients of both the target and the lagged inflation are significant 
at the 1% significance level but those of the interaction terms are not, the results of 
the absolute value model with OLS may suggest that there is some evidence of the 
asymmetry between inflation target misses in the sense that the weights put on 
overshooting and undershooting are not the same.  
This analysis can be extended in a way that differentiates EMEs and INDs and 
then runs the estimation model in order to analyze the reasons behind the different 
performances of the inflation targeting regime in EMEs and INDs.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CASE STUDIES OF SUCCESSFUL INFLATION TARGETERS 
 
 
  
By examining all of the inflation targeting countries both the emerging market 
economies and the industrialized countries in detail, it is prominent that countries 
generally miss their inflation targets by overshooting. However, from the emerging 
market economies Brazil and from the industrialized countries Switzerland are the 
successful inflation targeters. 
In the time interval that is looked over, Brazil achieved its inflation target in the 
years of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 and Switzerland in 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008 whereas Hungary overshooted in the years of 2003, 
2004, 2006, 2007 and 2009 and South Africa in 2002, 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
 
Table 4.1: Actual and Target Inflation for Brazil in Its Successful Years 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 20084 2009 
Actual Inflation (%) 7,601 5,690 3,141 4,457 5,902 4,312 
Inflation Target Band 
(%) 
3-8 2-7 2,5-6,5 2,5-6,5 2,5-6,5 2,5-6,5 
 
                                                 
4 Since the inflation report of Brazil for 2008 and 2009 cannot be found, these years are not analyzed 
for Brazil. 
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From the above table for Brazil, it can be seen that the average actual inflation 
is 5,18% which is not very small. However, I chose Brazil to analyze since it set 
plausible inflation targets and achieved them. 
 
Table 4.2: Actual and Target Inflation for Switzerland in Its Successful Years 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 
Actual Inflation (%) 0,891 0,594 1,332 1,006 0,621 0,701 
Inflation Target Band (%) 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 
 
From the above table for Switzerland, it can be seen that the average actual 
inflation is 0,85% which is very small. 
 
 Table 4.3: Actual and Target Inflation for Hungary in Its Overshooting Years 
 2003 2004 2006 2007 2009 
Actual Inflation (%) 5,699 5,501 6,500 7,398 5,600 
Inflation Target Band (%) 2,5-4,5 2,5-4,5 2-4 2-4 2-4 
 
From the above table for Hungary, it can be seen that it overshooted its 
inflation targets for those years and the average actual inflation is 6,14% which is 
high. 
 
Table 4.4: Actual and Target Inflation for South Africa in Its Overshooting 
Years 
 2002 2007 2008 2009 
Actual Inflation (%) 12,430 8,999 9,500 6,329 
Inflation Target Band (%) 3-6 3-6 3-6 3-6 
 
From the above table for South Africa, it can be seen that it overshooted its 
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inflation targets for those years and the average actual inflation is 9,31% which is 
very high.  
In order to capture the reasons behind being a successful inflation targeter, I 
analyzed these four countries where two of them are successful and the two of them 
are not from the perspectives of exchange rate regimes, interest rate regimes, fiscal 
tightness conditions and capital control conditions. In the capital control conditions 
title, current account balance, capital account balance, financial account balance, 
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment (fdi) are examined. 
 
 
4.1 Exchange Rate Regimes 
The exchange rate movements of the successful inflation targeters that are Brazil and 
Switzerland in their target achievement years and those of the not successful inflation 
targets that are Hungary and South Africa in their overshooting years are examined.  
In conclusion, a general statement about the appreciation or depreciation of the 
currencies of the successful inflation targeters cannot be made. However, exchange 
rate regimes of these two countries are floating as both the Brazil and the 
Switzerland allowed the value of their currencies to fluctuate. Furthermore, a general 
statement about the appreciation or depreciation of the currencies of the overshooting 
inflation targeters cannot be made. Exchange rate regimes of these two countries are 
floating as both the Hungary and the South Africa allowed the value of their 
currencies to fluctuate. However, there is a point for South Africa to be mentioned. 
Its currency depreciated almost all of the years that the inflation target is 
overshooted. It can be attributed mostly to the limited time to fulfill the necessary 
preconditions that are emerged from the gradual liberalisation decision of the South 
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African government of exchange controls after 1994.5 
 
 
4.2 Interest Rate Regimes 
The interest rate changes of the successful inflation targeter central banks that are 
Brazil and Switzerland in their target achievement years and those of the not 
successful inflation targets that are Hungary and South Africa in their overshooting 
years are examined.  
In conclusion, a general statement about the increase or decrease in the key 
rates of the successful inflation targeters cannot be made. However, interest rate 
regimes of these two countries are not supporting the view of the full liberalisation of 
financial markets. On the contrary, their regimes are interventionist in consideration 
of both the global and the domestic conditions. However, there is a point that draws 
the attention for Brazil. In 2005, 2006 and 2007, market interest rates decreased due 
to the adjusted expectations caused by the convergence of actual inflation and 
inflation targets. Therefore, it is obvious that Brazil was a successful inflation 
targeter since it kept the market expectations in control and needed less amount of 
interest rate interventions. On the contrary, in 2004, Switzerland put more weight on 
the economic upswing than the price stability and needed more interest rate 
interventions. Furthermore, a general statement about the increase or decrease in the 
key rates of the overshooting inflation targeters cannot be made. Also, the interest 
rate regimes of these two countries are not supporting the view of the full 
liberalisation of financial markets and their regimes are interventionist in 
consideration of both the global and the domestic conditions. However, there is a 
                                                 
5 This information is taken from the fourth fact sheet of the South African Central Bank titled as 
“Exchange Rates and Exchange Control”.  
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point that draws the attention for Hungary. For its overshooting years for 2007 and 
2009, central bank entered into an easing cycle and cut the key rates. On the contrary, 
for these years, it was not expected from Hungarian Central Bank to implement a 
loose monetary policy. The same criticism can be made for the South African Central 
Bank in 2008 and 2009.  
 
 
4.3 Fiscal Tightness Conditions 
The fiscal policies of the successful inflation targeters that are Brazil and Switzerland 
in their target achievement years and those of the not successful inflation targets that 
are Hungary and South Africa in their overshooting years are examined.  
In conclusion, it cannot be suggested that there is a general statement that the 
successful inflation targeters give government budget deficits or surpluses. However, 
from the experience of Brazil, it can be understood that successful inflation targeters 
give budget surpluses or from Switzerland, if they give budget deficits, they at least 
set some constitutional mechanisms of budget relieving aiming to eliminate current 
structural deficits. Furthermore, it can be suggested that there is a general statement 
that the overshooting inflation targeters give mostly budget deficits since for all of 
the overshooting years for both Hungary and South Africa, except 2007 for South 
Africa, high budget deficits are recorded.  
Besides, there was a good intervention of the Switzerland in 2003. In 2006, the 
budget deficit as the percentage of GDP decreased due to the constitutional 
mechanism of budget relieving programme that was set in 2003 aiming to eliminate 
the current structural deficit until 2007 and making savings by the way of spending 
cuts. Also, in 2008, the budget deficit turned into a budget surplus thanks to the 
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commitment to that budget relieving programme. 
 
 
4.4 Capital Control Conditions 
The capital control conditions of the successful inflation targeters that are Brazil and 
Switzerland in their target achievement years and those of the not successful inflation 
targets that are Hungary and South Africa in their overshooting years are examined.  
In conclusion, it is seen from the successful inflation targeters, both Brazil and 
Switzerland that successful inflation targeters give current account surpluses. 
However, it cannot be suggested that there is a general statement that the successful 
inflation targeters give financial account deficit or surplus and/or capital account 
deficit or surplus and/or net inflow of portfolio investment. Furthermore, it is 
pronounced from the overshooting inflation targeters, both Hungary and South 
Africa, that overshooting inflation targeters mostly give current account deficits, 
except for 2009 for Hungary and 2003 for South Africa. However, it cannot be 
suggested that there is a general statement that the overshooting inflation targeters 
give financial account deficit or surplus and/or capital account deficit or surplus 
and/or net inflow of portfolio investment. The point that these four countries did not 
set a rule for limiting foreign capital both in terms of portfolio investment and 
foreign direct investment is prominent.  
This analysis can be extended in the direction of analyzing the capital control 
conditions in order to investigate the way how the balance between the current, 
capital and financial accounts is ensured.  
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4.5 Analyzing The Reasons of Undershooting 
By examining all of the inflation targeting countries both the emerging market 
economies and the industrialized countries in detail, it can be seen that countries 
rather overshooted than undershooting. However, in some years countries 
undershooted their inflation targets and the most prominent undershooting countries 
are Czech Republic and Poland. 
In the time interval that is looked over, Czech Republic undershooted its 
inflation target in the years of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009 and Poland in 
2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006. 
  
Table 4.5: Inflation Target Misses of Czech Republic in Its Undershooting Years 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2009 
Actual Inflation (%) 0,637 1,055 2,714 2,236 1,690 0,984 
Inflation Target Band 
(%) 
3-5 3-5 3-5 3-5 2-4 2-4 
Miss (undershoot) (%)6 3,363 2,945 1,286 1,764 1,310 2,016 
 
From the above table for Czech Republic, it can be seen that the average miss 
of undershooting is 2,114% for those years. 
 
Table 4.6: Inflation Target Misses of Poland in Its Undershooting Years 
 2002 2003 2005 2006 
Actual Inflation (%) 0,800 1,700 0,700 1,400 
Inflation Target Band (%) 2-4 2-4 1,5-3,5 1,5-3,5 
Miss (undershoot) (%) 2,200 1,300 1,800 1,100 
 
From the above table for Poland, it can be seen that the average miss of 
undershooting is 1,6% for those years. 
                                                 
6 Inflation target misses are calculated as the differences between the actual inflation and the middle 
of the target band. 
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In order to capture the reasons behind undershooting, I analyzed these two 
countries from the perspectives of exchange rate regimes, interest rate regimes, fiscal 
tightness conditions and capital control conditions. In the capital control conditions 
title, current account balance, capital account balance, financial account balance, 
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment (fdi) are examined. 
 
 
4.5.1 Exchange Rate Regimes 
The exchange rate movements of these undershooting inflation targeters in their 
target undershooting years are examined.  
In conclusion, a general statement about the appreciation or depreciation of the 
currencies of the undershooting countries cannot be made. Exchange rate regimes of 
these two countries are floating since both the Czech Republic and the Poland 
allowed the value of their currencies to fluctuate. 
 There was a good intervention of the Central Bank of Czech Republic in 2006. 
In September, Koruna depreciated gradually. At that time the Central Bank of Czech 
Republic intervened and raised the interest rates and then, Koruna became to 
appreciate again. 
 
 
4.5.2 Interest Rate Regimes 
The interest rate changes of these undershooting inflation targeter central banks in 
their undershooting years are examined.  
In conclusion, a general statement about the increase or decrease in the key 
rates of the undershooting countries cannot be made. However, interest rate regimes 
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of these two countries are not supporting the view of full liberalisation of financial 
markets. On the contrary, their regimes are interventionist in consideration of both 
the global and the domestic conditions. 
There was a good intervention of the Central Bank of Czech Republic in 2009. 
The economy was affected by the global financial and economic crisis. Central Bank 
of Czech Republic intervened and reduced the key rates and thus the market interest 
rates decreased and the economic activity increased. 
 
 
4.5.3 Fiscal Tightness Conditions 
The fiscal policies of the undershooting inflation targeters in their undershooting 
years are examined.  
In conclusion, it cannot be suggested that there is a general statement that the 
undershooting countries give government budget deficit although these two country 
examples showed that they do. However, from the examples of the Czech Republic 
and Poland, it can be understood that undershooting countries’ public debt can 
increase but those increases are compensated next year with some presented Acts. 
There was a good intervention of the Poland government in 2003. In 2002, 
Poland presented “Draft 2003 Budget Act” in order to reduce the budget spending 
and the budget deficit. However, in 2003, budget deficit expanded by a substantial 
amount due to the rise in subsidies transferred to the Social Secuirty and 
Employment Funds. For this reason, the government did not only present “Draft 
2004 Budget Act” but also an extra new reform which is called “Programme of 
Streamlining and Curbing Public Expenditure” that was aiming to reduce 
expenditures by envisaging a reform for the social areas that the public funds were 
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distributed ineffectively. With the help of this programme, Poland reduced its deficit 
and the growth rate of the public debt in 2005. 
 
4.5.4 Capital Control Conditions 
The capital control conditions of the undershooting inflation targeters in their 
undershooting years are examined.  
In conclusion, it cannot be suggested that there is a general statement that the 
undershooting countries give current account and/or capital account deficit or surplus 
and/or net inflow of portfolio investment. However, from the examples of the Czech 
Republic and Poland, it can be understood that undershooting countries are attracting 
a substantial amount of net inflow of foreign direct investment. Furthermore, these 
two countries did not set a rule for limiting foreign capital both in terms of portfolio 
investment and foreign direct investment. 
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Figure 1.1: Average Inflation Before and After Adoption of Inflation Targeting 
Source: IMF Database. 
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 Figure 1.2: Average Inflation Before and After Adoption of Inflation Targeting 
in EMEs and INDs 
Source: IMF Database. 
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Figure 1.3: Average Inflation Target Misses 
Sources: IMF Database and Central Banks of Countries. 
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Figure 1.4: Average Absolute Inflation Target Misses 
Sources: IMF Database and Central Banks of Countries. 
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Table 4.7: Estimation Results of the Arellano-Bond Fixed Effects Model 
  
Dependent Variable: ITM                                                       
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments                    
Transformation: First Differences                                           
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2008                                                 
Cross-sections included: 12                                                     
Total panel (balanced) observations: 60                                  
Difference specification instrument weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Instrument list: @DYN(ITM,-2) EX FIS OIL                        
Variable        Coefficient              Std. Error           t-Statistic         Prob.   
ITM(-1)         0.341248                   0.092228             3.700058         0.0005 
EX                 0.003903                   0.002100             1.859038         0.0683 
FIS               -0.049540                   0.023589            -2.100106         0.0402 
OIL                0.029598                   0.010534             2.809725         0.0068 
 
                                             Effects Specification                          
Cross-section fixed (first differences)                                   
R-squared                     -0.099678                Mean dependent var       0.380000 
Adjusted R-squared     -0.158590                 S.D. dependent var         2.697004 
S.E. of regression          2.902996                Sum squared resid           471.9336 
J-statistic                       27.33487                 Instrument rank              18.00000 
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Table 4.8: Estimation Results of the Main OLS Model 
  
Dependent Variable: EXP01   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 147   
Included observations: 147   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.355740 0.201996 1.761122 0.0804
TAR 0.485197 0.104683 4.634895 0.0000
ACT 0.479321 0.052147 9.191692 0.0000
TAR*ITMT -0.035026 0.020322 -1.723514 0.0870
ACT*ITMT 0.022009 0.011432 1.925268 0.0562
R-squared 0.882378     Mean dependent var 3.855102
Adjusted R-squared 0.879065     S.D. dependent var 2.743290
S.E. of regression 0.953998     Akaike info criterion 2.777112
Sum squared resid 129.2360     Schwarz criterion 2.878827
Log likelihood -199.1177     F-statistic 266.3153
Durbin-Watson stat 1.212795     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 4.9: Estimation Results of the Main Panel GMM Model 
  
Dependent Variable: EXP01   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Sample: 2003 2009   
Cross-sections included: 21   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 147  
Identity instrument weighting matrix  
Instrument list: C TAR ACT TAR*ITMT ACT*ITMT  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.355740 0.201996 1.761122 0.0804
TAR 0.485197 0.104683 4.634895 0.0000
ACT 0.479321 0.052147 9.191692 0.0000
TAR*ITMT -0.035026 0.020322 -1.723514 0.0870
ACT*ITMT 0.022009 0.011432 1.925268 0.0562
R-squared 0.882378     Mean dependent var 3.855102
Adjusted R-squared 0.879065     S.D. dependent var 2.743290
S.E. of regression 0.953998     Sum squared resid 129.2360
Durbin-Watson stat 2.100508     J-statistic 4.63E-26
Instrument rank 5.000000    
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Table 4.10: Estimation Results of the Absolute Value Model Specification  
 
Dependent Variable: EXP01   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 147   
Included observations: 147   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TAR 0.694726 0.095360 7.285267 0.0000
ACT 0.402643 0.077630 5.186713 0.0000
TARITM -0.040724 0.027956 -1.456700 0.1474
ACTITM 0.024398 0.017646 1.382623 0.1689
R-squared 0.875513     Mean dependent var 3.855102
Adjusted R-squared 0.872901     S.D. dependent var 2.743290
S.E. of regression 0.978009     Akaike info criterion 2.820238
Sum squared resid 136.7798     Schwarz criterion 2.901611
Log likelihood -203.2875     Durbin-Watson stat 1.235152
 
 
